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Abstract
■ Despite advances in understanding the brain structures
involved in the expression of stereotypes and prejudice, little
is known about the brain structures involved in their acquisi-
tion. Here, we combined fMRI, a task involving learning the
valence of different social groups, and modeling of the learn-
ing process involved in the development of biases in thinking
about social groups that support prejudice. Participants read
descriptions of valenced behaviors performed by members of
novel social groups, with majority groups being more fre-
quently encountered during learning than minority groups.
A model-based fMRI analysis revealed that the anterior tem-
poral lobe tracked the trial-by-trial changes in the valence
associated with each group encountered in the task. Descrip-
tions of behavior by group members that deviated from the
group average (i.e., prediction errors) were associated with
activity in the left lateral pFC, dorsomedial pFC, and lateral
anterior temporal cortex. Minority social groups were associ-
ated with slower acquisition rates and more activity in the
ventral striatum and ACC/dorsomedial pFC compared with
majority groups. These findings provide new insights into
the brain regions that (a) support the acquisition of preju-
dice and (b) detect situations in which an individual’s behav-
ior deviates from the prejudicial attitude held toward their
group. ■
INTRODUCTION
Stereotypes and prejudice contribute to the intergroup
attitudes that underlie a great deal of our social cognition
(Fiske, 1998). Stereotypes are cognitive representations
of the properties and features of social groups: how
members of group X are similar to one another and
different from members of group Y. Stereotypes can con-
vey purely descriptive meaning and thus differentiate
between groups on descriptive dimensions (e.g., “Scottish
people are fair-skinned”; “Greek people are tanned”), or
they can involve valenced information (e.g., “Buddhists
are peaceful”; “Neo-Nazis are violent”). Relations of
groups with valenced information make contact with the
concept of prejudice, which refers to attitudes of liking or
disliking members of social groups based on their mem-
bership (“I do not like Neo-Nazis”). On the one hand,
stereotyping and prejudice have the capacity to improve
decision-making by simplifying a large body of complex
knowledge and allowing us to make rapid judgments
regarding group members (Kunda, 1999); on the other
hand, they can negatively bias our choices because of
overgeneralization (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Fiske,
1998; Gilbert & Hixon 1991).
Recently, there has been substantial interest in using
fMRI to explore the brain regions and to help unpack the
processing involved in social judgments that might sup-
port stereotypic and prejudicial beliefs (e.g., Amodio,
2014; Gilbert, Swencionis, & Amodio, 2012; Contreras,
Banaji, & Mitchell, 2011; Quadflieg & Macrae, 2011;
Quadflieg et al., 2009, 2011; Amodio & Lieberman, 2009;
Mitchell, Ames, Jenkins, & Banaji, 2009). Such studies
have tended to explore either the brain regions involved
in the application of learned attitudes (Contreras et al.,
2011; Quadflieg et al., 2009, 2011) or the implicit impact
that stereotypes have on cognition and brain activation
(Gilbert et al., 2012; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006;
Wheeler & Fiske, 2005; Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson,
2004; Phelps et al., 2000). From this research, a number
of brain regions have been implicated, which include the
anterior temporal lobe, amygdala, insula, striatum, dorsal
medial pFC, and lateral pFC (see Amodio, 2014, for a
review). Such brain regions overlap to some degree with
brain regions implicated in thinking about other people’s
mental states (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006),
which may relate to a need to consider the intentions of
others when learning about them.
Despite these advances, there has been little investi-
gation of the brain regions involved in the formation of
intergroup attitudes. Although such attitudes can be de-
veloped indirectly via cultural transmission (e.g., we may
hold prejudicial beliefs regarding groups that we have
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never actually experienced: Katz & Braly, 1933), it is equally
clear that our stereotypic and prejudicial attitudes are also
influenced by our own experience with group members
(Olson & Fazio, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Acquiring
and updating attitudes on the basis of experience involve
processes of learning and memory involved in categori-
zation, wherein people learn to associate social groups
with certain types of behavior, traits, or valence based
on their experience with group members, according to
principles described by learning theories (e.g., Murphy,
Schmeer, Vallee-Tourangeau, Mondragon, & Hilton,
2011; Le Pelley et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2009; Van Rooy,
Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003).
Previous neuroimaging studies have successfully applied
the concepts in learning theories to examine the brain
regions involved in predicting another individual’s behav-
ior (Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2012; Suzuki et al.,
2012; Cloutier, Gabrieli, O’Young, & Ambady, 2011; Harris
& Fiske, 2010; Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth,
2008). However, such studies have focused on learning
the attributes of specific individuals (person perception)
rather than the perception of social groups. Moreover,
there has been little research exploring how brain regions
process minority social groups in comparison with ma-
jority groups.
As a particular class of social groups, minorities tend
to be perceived differently from groups constituting
most of the population (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996).
Rather than assuming that this bias is a function of a
specific culturally transmitted experience, Hamilton and
Gifford (1976) suggested that minority group biases might
emerge from unbiased learning processes. It is a common
perception in the media that minority groups possess, on
average, more negative traits thanmajority groupmembers
(Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996). More generally, minority
groups are perceived as less representative of the overall
population than are majority groups. That is, in the context
of a population engaged in mostly positive behaviors,
minority groups are typically perceived as less positive
than majority groups; in the context of a population en-
gaged in mostly negative behaviors, minorities are per-
ceived as less negative than majorities (Hamilton & Gifford,
1976). Hamilton and Gifford (1976) developed an ex-
perimental procedure for evaluating the acquisition of
minority group perceptions and an attentional theory for
explaining this effect. In a first experiment, they presented
participants with statements describing behaviors per-
formed by members of two fictitious groups, Groups A
and B (e.g., “Joe, a member of group A, helped the old
man across the street”). Members of both Groups A and
B were described as engaging in the same proportion of
positive and negative behaviors and with the same greater
proportion of positive behaviors (69% positive, 31% nega-
tive). Hence, Hamilton and Gifford (1976) argued that an
unbiased observer would judge both groups as being
equally likeable. However, they also manipulated whether
the statements described a majority or minority group by
presenting participants with twice as many statements
about members of Group A as Group B. On a range of
subsequent measures, participants perceived the minority
group (B) as less desirable than the majority group (A).
The same result was found in their Experiment 2 in which
both minority and majority groups were engaged in more
negative behaviors than positive behaviors. Under these
conditions, participants judged the minority group as less
negative. This effect was termed an “illusory correlation”
because there was no objective difference in the correla-
tion between group membership and behavioral valence
for the two groups. Subsequent research has found this
to be a robust effect (for a review, see Berndsen, Spears,
van der Pligt, & McGarty, 2002).
Recent work (Kutzner & Fiedler, 2015; Murphy et al.,
2011) has suggested that this type of correlative learning
is captured by the basic assumptions derived from error
correction learning algorithms such as that proposed by
Rescorla and Wagner (1972). Selective learning, like that
observed in the illusory correlation study (Hamilton &
Gifford, 1976), can be accounted for by the incremental
acquisition of associative links between group labels and
the emotional valence signaled by the behavioral state-
ments (Murphy et al., 2011). Under this approach, the
illusory correlation effect emerges naturally as a conse-
quence of differences in the amount of learning about
the two groups. Consider the situation in which both ma-
jority and minority groups are paired with mostly positive
behaviors. Because associative models are sensitive to the
degree of contingency between events, this approach an-
ticipates that observers will—at asymptote—form equally
strong, positively valenced beliefs regarding both groups.
However, because changes in associative strength are a
function of experience, less experience of the minority
group will ensure that learning about this group lags be-
hind learning about the majority group. Consequently, at
a given point in training (before asymptote), positive atti-
tudes will tend to be stronger for the more frequently pre-
sented majority group than the less frequent minority
group. Consistent with this account, this was exactly the
pattern observed empirically by Murphy et al. (2011).
Here, we used an adapted version of the procedure
described by Hamilton and Gifford (1976) and fMRI to de-
termine the brain regions involved in the formation of
intergroup prejudicial attitudes. By applying a simple as-
sociative model to the participants’ data, we were able to
derive estimates of the trial-by-trial parameters capturing
the learned valence of the social groups encountered and
the prediction errors associated with learning. Whereas
Hamilton and Gifford (1976) had participants learn about
two social groups, we had participants learn about four
groups, which differed in minority/majority status and
valence (largely negative or largely positive). This allowed
us to examine the brain regions involved in learning atti-
tudes about social groups as a function of both the group’s
overall valence (positive vs. negative) and its minority/
majority status.
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METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two right-handed, healthy volunteers (11 men, age
range = 20–34 years, mean = 24.1 years, SD = 4.3 years)
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated
in this experiment. All participants reported that they
were free from neurological and psychiatric disease and
gave informed written consent in accordance with the
local research ethics committee. During scanning, head
movements were monitored by observing the difference
in position of the head between each volume acquired
on the MRI console. Four (one man, three women) par-
ticipants moved considerably (approximately >8 mm in
one plane) at repeated moments during scanning. We
excluded these participants because of the poor quality
of data generated by such motion.
Stimuli
Stimuli presented during scanning were the names of 12
fictitious groups and 180 sentences describing valenced
behaviors (see Figure 1A), which had been piloted with
a separate set of participants to generate ratings of
valence, commonness, and imageability. Eight of the group
names were allocated to our main experimental trials
(Hezlatts, Pellums, Grallacks, Selners, Kitils, Vatges,
Drayos, and Trithans); four were used in each scanning
session. Four names were allocated to control condition
trials (Raymers, Breggs, Cetners, and Feplers); two were
used in each scanning session. The experimental group
names were pseudorandomly allocated to each type of
group across participants such that the names were as
likely to be associated with a positive group or a nega-
tive group and a minority group or a majority group.
The control group names were similarly likely to be as-
sociated with a majority or minority control group. Sen-
tences describing behaviors were selected from an
initial pool of 500 sentences developed by our team.
An initial inspection of the sentences suggested that
commonness and imageability would be highly variable
across them and might correlate with valence. Thus, 15
undergraduates who did not take part in the fMRI study
rated the 500 sentences on valence, commonness, and
imageability using a scale of 1–7 (with 1 representing ex-
tremely negative, uncommon, or unimageable; 7 repre-
senting extremely positive, common, or imageable; and
4 representing a neutral midpoint). Across all sentences,
valence was positively correlated with commonness (r = .62,
p< .01) and imageability (r= .30, p< .01). Commonness
Figure 1. Experimental
task. (A) Example of stimuli
presented in 2 of the 18 trials
composing each of the five
experimental blocks. Each trial
began with the presentation
of a fixation cross, which was
followed by the presentation
of a group name and followed
by a description of a behavior.
Control block trials were
identical to the main blocks
with the exception that no
behavior was presented below
the group name and only
two group names were used
in the blocks. Each block of
18 trials was separated by the
sequential presentation of
each of the group names
and a prompt to rate the
valence of each group.
There was no time constraint
on the rating period.
(B) Contingency table for
the composition of trials in
each block of 18 trials.
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and imageability were also positively correlated (r = .28,
p < .01).
A tertile split on valence ratings was used to divide
sentences into positive (the top-rated third of sentences)
and negative (the bottom-rated third of sentences) cate-
gories. A cutoff was imposed to exclude sentences with
a mean rating lying within 0.5 points of the extremely
valence pole. This was done to improve the likelihood
that learning would be gradual (Murphy et al., 2011).
Negative and positive sentences were ranked according
to their standard deviation, and 90 sentences in each
group with the smallest standard deviation were chosen
as stimuli. The mean valence judgments for the negative
and positive sentences that were chosen as stimuli were
M = 2.13 (SE = 0.06) and M = 6.09 (SE = 0.03), respec-
tively, where 1 = most negative and 7 = most positive.
For example, the sentence “Consoled a friend whose
grandfather had passed away” was rated as 6.53, whereas
“Kicked a stray cat on the way home from work” was
rated as 1.40. The sentences describing negative behav-
iors were judged as being less common behaviors than
sentences describing positive behaviors (negative: M =
3.96, SE = 0.10; positive: M = 5.11, SE = 0.66; t(178) =
9.38, p < .001). Positive sentences were rated as having
higher levels of imageability compared with negative sen-
tences (positive:M= 4.98, SE= 0.06; negative:M= 4.57,
SE = 0.07; t(178) = 4.38, p < .001). There was no signifi-
cant difference in the lengths of the sentences (number of
words) between negative and positive sentences (positive:
M = 8.3, SE = 1.9; negative: M = 8.9, SE = 2.08; t(178) =
1.76, p = .08).
The learning task during fMRI consisted of two sepa-
rate learning sessions, each consisting of five blocks of
18 trials. This approach is similar to that used by Murphy
et al. (2011), which reported significant effects of learn-
ing over five blocks with two groups. Each trial consisted
of the presentation of a group name followed by a de-
scription of a behavior. Each block of 18 trials contained
six trials displaying the majority negative group name,
six trials displaying the majority positive group name,
three trials displaying the minority negative group name, and
three trials displaying the minority positive group name
(see Figure 1). For each positive group, there were two
positive sentences for every one negative sentence, and
vice versa for the negative group. Thus, similar to Hamilton
and Gifford’s (1976) design, the behaviors associated with
the majority and minority groups were equally positive or
negative but differed purely in terms of the frequency with
which participants encountered them (see Figure 1B).
Negative and positive sentences were randomly allocated
to the groups across participants, and trial order was
randomized within each block, with the constraints that
(1) the mean valence was matched across minority and
majority groups, (2) no more than two trials with the same
group name could occur sequentially, and (3) at least one
trial with each group occurred in the first six trials, the
middle six trials, and the last six trials. This was done to
minimize the influence of any recency bias in participants’
valence ratings of the group names at the end of each
block.
Experimental Design and Procedures
Participants were informed that they would read sen-
tences describing the behavior of people in different
social groups and would have to intermittently rate how
positive or negative they perceived these social groups
to be. They were not informed about differences in group
frequency or proportion of negative/positive sentences.
Before scanning, participants were familiarized with the
trial and rating structure. A single practice trial was pre-
sented consisting of a group name and a sentence not
used in the actual experiment. After this, participants
were presented with the rating screen and allowed to
practice making a rating.
Two scanning sessions were conducted. Each session
involved learning about a new set of fictitious social groups.
During each session, five learning blocks of 18 trials were
presented. Each trial began with the presentation of one
of the four fictitious group names used for that session;
after a short delay (1.5 sec), a sentence describing a be-
havior appeared underneath (for 3.5 sec; see Figure 1A).
The intertrial interval was 2 sec during which a fixation
cross was displayed. At the end of the 2-sec fixation cross
on the last trial of each block of trials, participants were
asked to make an evaluative judgment about each of
the groups by rating them on a scale from −10 (strongly
dislike) to 10 (strongly like). Ratings were made by press-
ing buttons to increase or decrease the value presented
on the screen, which was initially set to 0. The order of
the group names presented in the rating period was ran-
domized with the constraint that no group name could
appear in the first, second, third, or last position more
than twice across blocks. Rating was self-paced, and no
feedback was given.
Learning blocks were interspersed with a control block
containing nine trials. Six of these trials featured the major-
ity control group name, and three featured the minority
control group name. On each of these control trials, par-
ticipants saw the group name and a fixation cross, but no
sentence describing behavior was presented. After the nine
trials of each control block, the names of the control
groups were presented again in a similar fashion to the
rating period for the experimental group names, but
rather than rating them, participants were instructed to
press a button when each group name appeared.
Modeling Learning from Behavioral Data
A simple associative model was fit to the behavioral data
and used to provide trial-by-trial measures for model-
based fMRI analyses. The model, based on the Rescorla–
Wagner (RW) model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), can be
viewed as a simple one-layer neural network (cf. Widrow
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& Hoff, 1988) in which the input layer I consists of four
units (one for each social group) and the output layer O
consists of one unit for positive valence and one unit for
negative valence. The activation of output unit Oi is cal-
culated as (Equation 1):
Oi ¼
Xm
i
Iiwij (1)
wherem is the number of input units andwij is the learned
association weight from input unit Ii to output unit Oi.
Association weight wij is updated according to the fol-
lowing learning rule (Equation 2):
Δwij ¼ niIi Ti − Oj
 
(2)
where ni is the learning rate associated with input unit Ii
and Tj is the target (i.e., observed) value for Oj. Weights
are adjusted by associative learning to minimize the dis-
crepancy between predicted and observed outcomes. Dif-
ferent learning rate parameters allow for the possibility
that different inputs vary in their saliency or associability.
For example, social groups associated with negative
behaviors may be more salient than groups associated
with positive behaviors.
In the present task, all units were coded as 0 (absent)
or 1 ( present). For instance, when the second social
group was presented, the input unit corresponding to
this group would be set to 1 with the other input units
set to 0. Likewise, during learning, when a negative be-
havior was observed, the output unit representing nega-
tive valence would be set to 1 with the unit representing
positive valence set to 0.
fMRI Parameters and Acquisition
Participants were scanned at the Birkbeck-UCL Centre for
Neuroimaging using a 1.5-T Siemens (Siemens Medical
Systems, Erlangen, Germany) Avanto MRI scanner, with
a 32-channel head coil. Functional scans were acquired
using a gradient-echo EPI sequence (repetition time =
3000 msec, echo time = 48 msec, field of view = 205 ×
205, matrix = 64 × 64). In each volume, thirty-six 3.2-mm-
thick oblique axial slices were acquired. Anterior-to-
posterior phase encoding and a tilt were applied to
the sequence to improve signal in OFC and amygdala.
After this, a high-resolution T1 structural scan was
acquired (magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo,
176 slices, 1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution). Foam padding
was used to minimize head motions, and ear plugs were
used to dampen the noise of the scanner. Stimuli were
projected centrally onto a screen at the front of the
magnet, which participants viewed using a mirror
mounted on the head coil (visual angle of the whole
screen = 21° × 13°).
fMRI Preprocessing and Statistical Analysis
The first six functional volumes (dummy scans) of each of
the two sessions conducted were discarded to permit T1
equilibrium. Initial inspection of the EPI images revealed
that four participants moved excessively during their
scans, and these were excluded before preprocessing
(see Participants). SPM (SPM8; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/software/spm8) was used for spatial preprocessing
and subsequent analyses. Images were spatially realigned
to the first volume of the first session to correct for motion
artifacts, normalized to a standard EPI template in Montreal
Neurological Institute space with a resampled voxel size
of 3 × 3 × 3 mm, and smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM
Gaussian kernel filter.
After preprocessing, the smoothed, normalized func-
tional imaging data were entered into three voxel-wise
participant-specific general linear models (GLMs; i.e.,
the first-level design matrix). The first GLM was con-
structed to test for the effects of parameters derived from
our RWmodel. The second GLM focused on the RWmodel
parameters for the response for the negative groups be-
cause the participants’ ratings for negative groups revealed
clearer evidence of learning over the five blocks (see
Results below). The third GLM was specified to examine
the categorical effects of valence (negative vs. positive
groups) and frequency (majority vs. minority groups).
The first GLM consisted of the following categorical re-
gressors (modeled as box-car functions spanning the
duration of each trial/period) for each session: (1) rating
periods, (2) control block minority group trials, (3) control
block majority group trials, and (4) all the trials of the
groups in the main learning blocks. Two additional para-
metric modulators of the main experimental group trials
were entered. These were the learned valence of each
group (Oi) and the prediction error parameter (Tj − Oi)
derived from our RW model of the behavioral data (see
Figure 2). To examine the independent effects of learned
valence and prediction error, we entered our parametric
regressors without serial orthogonalization. These regres-
sors convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response
function. Furthermore, six participant-specific movement
parameters (derived from the realignment phase of pre-
processing) were also included as regressors of no inter-
est in the model.
The second GLM explored parametric responses for
the negative groups. This analysis was conducted after
we had determined that the ratings of the negative
groups showed more gradual learning over the blocks
than did the ratings of the positive groups. This GLM
was identical to the first GLM except for two alterations.
The first alteration was that, in each session, the single
regressor for all the main experimental trials was replaced
by three regressors: one for the minority positive group,
one for the majority positive group, and one for all of the
negative group trials. The second alteration was that
parametric modulation (learned affect and prediction
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error) was applied only to this negative group trial
regressor.
The third GLM explored categorical effects of all
groups and was identical to the second GLM except for
two alterations. These were as follows: (1) the regressor
for the negative trials was replaced by two regressors,
one for the negative majority group trials and one for
the negative minority group trials, and (2) no parametric
modulation was applied.
For all models, a high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 sec
was used to remove low-frequency drifts. Temporal auto-
correlation was modeled using an AR(1) process. At the
first level, linear weighted contrasts were used to identify
effects of interest, providing contrast images for group
effects analyzed at the second (random effects) level.
Given our a priori anatomical hypotheses, we predicted
significant activations in the following brain regions:
anterior temporal lobe, lateral (inferior frontal gyrus)
and medial pFC, amygdala, striatum, and insula (see
Amodio, 2014, for a review). All ROIs were anatomically
predefined in the Wake Forest University PickAtlas soft-
ware (www.fmri.wfubmc.edu), except the insula, which
was defined in the SPM anatomy toolbox (www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/ext/#Anatomy). A threshold of p< .05 cor-
rected for family-wise error and a minimum of five voxels
were used for the whole-brain analysis and within ROIs.
No contrasts using a threshold of p < .05 corrected for
the whole-brain volume with a minimum of five voxels
revealed any significant effects in our analysis. For com-
pleteness, we report all regions significant at a threshold
of p< .001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons) and a
minimum of five voxels in Table 1.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Analysis of the mean judgments of the group labels
across the two scanning sessions revealed that partici-
pants learned about the positive and negative groups.
Figure 2 presents the mean valence for the majority
and minority groups averaged across the two sessions
of training and averaged across the two valences (positive
and absolute value of the negative judgments). The
pattern of data shows a differential learning effect for
the majority and minority groups. A mixed ANOVA with
factors of Valence (negative vs. positive) × Group size
(minority vs. majority) × Blocks (5) × Scanning session
(2) supported these observations. The negative groups
and the majority groups received more extreme ratings
overall as illustrated by the reliable main effects of
valence (F(1, 17) = 17.276, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.504) and
group size (F(1, 17) = 4.744, p < .04, ηp
2 = 0.218). In
addition, the two-way interactions between valence and
group size as well as between valence and blocks were
significant (F(1, 17) = 4.934, p < .04, ηp
2 = 0.225 and
F(4, 68) = 2.734, p< .036, ηp
2 = 0.139, respectively). There
Figure 2. Mean valence ratings across learning sessions. In each plot,
the mean valence of the groups is plotted against the trial block.
This mean is derived from the average of the two learning sessions.
Ratings could vary between 10 (most positive) and−10 (most negative).
(A) Ratings collapsed over both the negative and positive groups.
(B) Negative and positive groups separated.
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Table 1. Coordinates and Z Scores for Brain Regions Identified in the SPM Analysis
Brain Region x, y, z Cluster Size Z Score Significance Threshold
Learned Affect (Oj ) (All Groups)
R anterior temporal cortex 27, 8, −35 14 4.01 FWER < .05
L anterior temporal cortex −33, 11, 35 15 3.10 <.005 u.c.a
R cerebellum 15, −55, −32 11 4.02 <.001 u.c.
L intraparietal sulcus −36, −61, 34 12 3.56 <.001 u.c.
R middle occipital gyrus 24, −88, 4 15 3.45 <.001 u.c.
Prediction Error (Tj − Oj) (All Groups)
No regions
Learned Affect (Oj ) (Negative Groups)
L anterior temporal cortex −51, 14, −23 7 4.03 FWER < .05
R superior parietal gyrus 21, −73, 46 172 4.05 <.001 u.c.
R superior frontal gyrus 3, 17, 55 88 3.77 <.001 u.c.
R parahippocampal gyrus 24, −31, −17 9 3.76 <.001 u.c.
R angular gyrus 39, −76, 22 31 3.75 <.001 u.c.
R inferior occipital gyrus −27, −85, −14 6 3.70 <.001 u.c.
R middle occipital gyrus 30, −88, 4 18 3.63 <.001 u.c.
R middle frontal gyrus 42, 23, 34 23 3.61 <.001 u.c.
L cuneus −3, −94, −5 10 3.40 <.001 u.c.
Prediction Error (Tj − Oj) (Negative Groups)
L inferior frontal gyrus (lPFC) −48, 32, 4 328 5.28 FWER < .05
L superior frontal gyrus (dmPFC) −6, 50, 37 117 4.14 FWER < .05
R anterior temporal gyrus 54, 14, −20 23 4.29 FWER < .05
L calcarine sulcus −15, −88, −2 44 4.56 <.001 u.c.
R calcarine sulcus 15, −79, 10 29 3.72 <.001 u.c.
R thalamus 9, −13, 7 24 4.44 <.001 u.c.
L thalamus −12, −4, 13 28 3.90 <.001 u.c.
L middle frontal gyrus −39, −1, −39 63 4.08 <.001 u.c.
L superior temporal gyrus −57, −55, 16 107 3.86 <.001 u.c.
L fourth occipital gyrus −39, −58, −11 16 3.70 <.001 u.c.
Categorical: Negative Groups > Positive Groupsb
R inferior frontal gyrus 51, 23, 16 59 4.34 FWER < .05
L inferior frontal gyrus −51, 20, 7 5 3.57 FWER < .05
R ACC 6, 35, 28 56 3.37 FWER < .05
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Table 1. (continued )
Brain Region x, y, z Cluster Size Z Score Significance Threshold
R superior frontal gyrus 12, 41, 46 31 3.81 <.001 u.c.
R middle frontal gyrus 39, 8, 46 6 3.55 <.001 u.c.
R angular gyrus 63, −43, 28 14 3.59 <.001 u.c.
Categorical: Positive Groups > Negative Groupsb
R cingulate sulcus 15, −37, 52 44 4.34 <.001 u.c.
R putamen 33, −16, 7 24 4.17 <.001 u.c.
L uncus −30, 2, −23 7 4.00 <.001 u.c.
Categorical: Minority Groups > Majority Groups
dmPFC/ACC 0, 23, 40 145 4.82 FWER < .05
R ventral striatum 21, 17, −2 93 4.80 FWER < .05
L ventral striatum −18, 14, −5 46 3.88 <.001 u.c.
L superior parietal gyrus −12, −67, 40 741 4.79 <.001 u.c.
R superior parietal gyrus 12, −67, 37 741 4.75 <.001 u.c.
R posterior cingulate 6, −43, 19 224 4.53 <.001 u.c.
R inferior occipital gyrus 51, −61, −14 119 4.50 <.001 u.c.
L fusiform gyrus −45, −52, −20 165 4.13 <.001 u.c.
R pulvinar 15, −34, 1 19 4.14 <.001 u.c.
L pulvinar −21, −25, −5 36 3.91 <.001 u.c.
L middle occipital gyrus −30, −91, −11 19 3.98 <.001 u.c.
R middle occipital gyrus 33, −91, −2 150 3.88 <.001 u.c.
R middle frontal gyrus 36, 5, 64 16 3.92 <.001 u.c.
L middle frontal gyrus −42, 35, 34 18 3.81 <.001 u.c.
R cerebellum 33, −46, −26 32 3.75 <.001 u.c.
L circular insular sulcusc −39, 14, 4 12 3.72c <.001 u.c.
R angular gyrus 39, −67, 37 20 3.52 <.001 u.c.
Categorical: Majority Groups > Minority Groups
L dmPFC −9, 20, 43 10 3.86 <.001 u.c.
R cingulate sulcus 12, −16, 46 25 3.70 <.001 u.c.
L superior frontal gyrus −9, 50, 37 6 3.50 <.001 u.c.
Categorical: Minority Control Group > Majority Control Group
L superior frontal gyrus −30, 2, 67 36 4.99 <.001 u.c.
R superior frontal gyrus 15, 11, 67 5 3.56 <.001 u.c.
L inferior frontal gyrus −36, 29, 28 33 4.34 <.001 u.c.
L postcentral gyrus −48, −22, 40 15 3.99 <.001 u.c.
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was also a three-way interaction between blocks, valence,
and group size, indicating that the learning effect across
the blocks was different depending on valence and group
size (F(4, 68) = 2.738, p < .036, ηp
2 = 0.139). To investi-
gate this three-way interaction effect, we analyzed the
individual blocks and found that, during Blocks 1 and 2,
only the main effect of valence was significant (F(1, 17) =
10.66, p < .005, ηp
2 = 0.385). That is, on these two blocks,
the only difference was the stronger ratings for the nega-
tive groups. However, for Block 3, both the effect of
Table 1. (continued )
Brain Region x, y, z Cluster Size Z Score Significance Threshold
R middle frontal gyrus 54, −4, 43 10 3.35 <.001 u.c.
R intraparietal sulcus 33, −64, 34 6 3.27 <.001 u.c.
Categorical: Majority Control Group > Minority Control Group
L anterior hippocampus −30, −16, −17 6 3.45 <.001 u.c.
No brain region survived FWER correction for whole-brain volume. FWER = family-wise error corrected for anatomically defined ROI; L = left;
R = right.
aRegion does not survive correction for small-volume ROI but is listed here for completeness (see Figure 3). The ventral striatum refers to activity
in the region of the ventral putamen/head of the caudate/nucleus accumbens.
bThese analyses are included to help characterize the data, rather than test specific predictions.
cActivity in the insula did not reach significance for family-wise error correction for the insula ROI.
Figure 3. Brain activity that
tracks learned affect and
prediction error. (A) The
time course of learned affect
for all four social groups,
plotted from the data of a
single representative participant
from one of the two learning
sessions. The learned valence
parameter was calculated as
quantity Oi in Equation 1.
(B) Activity in the anterior
temporal lobes (white circles)
significantly correlated with
the learned valence parameter
for all groups (see Table 1).
Display threshold p < .005
uncorrected, shown on the
mean structural image. (C) The
time course for prediction error
for the negative groups for the
same session and participant
as shown in A. The prediction
error was calculated as Tj − Oi
(see Equation 2). (D) Activity
significantly correlated with
the negative group prediction
error: lateral pFC (lPFC),
dorsomedial pFC (dmPFC),
and anterior temporal lobe
(ATL; see Table 1). SPMs
are displayed on the mean
structural image at a threshold
of p < .005, uncorrected. Note
that the activity shown close to
the caudate does not survive
at p < .001 uncorrected or
at corrected thresholds.
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valence (F(1, 17) = 4.906, p < .041, ηp
2 = 0.224) and the
main effect of group size were significant (F(1, 17) =
6.363, p < .022, ηp
2 = 0.272); no other effects were sig-
nificant. This latter result suggests that, although the
negative groups remained more strongly negative than
the positive groups were positive, by Block 3, there was
also an effect of group size whereby the majority groups
received more extreme ratings than the minority groups,
replicating previous demonstrations of the illusory cor-
relation effect (Murphy et al., 2011; Hamilton & Gifford,
1976). Figure 2 shows that, during the last two blocks
(Blocks 4 and 5), the effect of group size disappeared
for the positive groups but not for the negative groups,
which continued to show stronger judgments of the major-
ity group. Specifically, during Blocks 4 and 5, the main ef-
fects of valence and group size interacted (minimum: F(1,
17)= 6.986, p< .017, ηp
2 = 0.291 onBlock 5) such that only
the negative groups were demonstrating a significant
effect of group size (minimum: F(1, 17) = 5.591, p < .030,
ηp
2 = 0.247).
Modeling Results
The model was fit to the behavioral data derived from the
ratings after each block and the postscan sentence ratings
given to the stimuli. The fitting procedure attempted to
maximize the correlation between the model’s predicted
valence judgment for each group (calculated as the dif-
ference between the activity of positive and negative
valence output units) and the ratings provided by the
participants. These model predictions were linearly trans-
formed to best match (r2 = .92) the participants’ ratings
(see Figure 2). In addition to the linear transformation,
model parameters included a learning rate of 0.109 for
the groups predominately associated with negative be-
haviors and a second learning rate of 0.002 for the posi-
tive groups. That is, the best-fitting learning rate for the
negative groups was almost 50 times higher than that for
positive groups. These fitted learning rates indicate that
there was little change in valence judgments over the
course of training for positive groups, whereas significant
learning for the negative groups continued across training.
fMRI Results
Anterior Temporal Lobe Activity Tracks the Acquisition
of the Learned Valence of the Social Groups
Within our ROIs, we found that activity in the right tem-
poral pole was significantly positively correlated with our
parametric measure of learned valence across all groups
(see Figure 3A, Table 1). At a more liberal threshold ( p<
.005 uncorrected), activity was also significantly correlated
with learned valence in the left temporal pole (Table 1).
Because the positive groups showed little evidence of
learning after the first block (Figure 2), we focused our
second analysis on the negative groups, which had a
pattern of more gradual learning over the five blocks in
each session (Figure 2). We found a significant positive
correlation between learned valence of the negative
groups and activity in the left anterior temporal cortex
(Table 1).
Prediction Errors for the Negative Groups Were
Correlated with Prefrontal and Anterior
Temporal Lobe Activity
An initial analysis involving all groups found no evidence
of brain activity significantly correlated with the predic-
tion errors, even at liberal uncorrected thresholds ( p <
.001 uncorrected). By contrast, when we examined the
prediction error for the negative groups (which was more
variable over the course of the two sessions; see Fig-
ure 3B), we found a network of brain regions, which in-
cluded the left lateral pFC, dorsomedial pFC, and right
lateral anterior temporal lobe (see Figure 3 and Table 1).
Categorical Effects of Group Status (Minority/Majority)
and Valence
In addition to examining the data with parametric vari-
ables derived from our model, we also examined the
Figure 4. Categorical responses to valence and group status. All SPMs
are shown displayed on the mean structural image at a threshold of
p < .005, uncorrected. See Table 1 for Montreal Neurological Institute
coordinates and Z scores. (A) Increased activity in the lateral pFC (lPFC)
and dorsomedial pFC (dmPFC) in response to the negative groups
compared with the positive groups. (B) Increased activity in the ventral
striatum (V. Str.) and dmPFC/cingulate regions in response to the
minority groups compared with the majority groups.
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categorical effect of group size (minority/majority). Activ-
ity in the ventral striatum and ACC/dorsomedial pFC was
significantly greater for the minority groups compared
with the majority groups (Figure 4B, Table 1). None of
our ROIs showed significantly greater activity for majority
groups than minority groups. We next examined whether
similar patterns of activity would be elicited in our con-
trol task, in which purely group names were presented
alone without any accompanying descriptions of behav-
iors. No evidence of increased activity in any of our ROIs
was detected when minority and majority control group
trials were compared (Table 1), suggesting that the
patterns obtained in the earlier analyses were relatively
specific to the case in which participants were asked to
form impressions of the social groups.
Finally, we compare responses elicited by the positive
and negative groups. Because negative behaviors were
associated with being less imageable and more uncom-
mon (see Stimuli), the comparison of negative and posi-
tive groups is difficult to draw clear inferences from. Thus,
we report this contrast to support future replication of
this experiment. Significantly more activity was observed
in the dorsomedial pFC (extending to the ACC) and bilat-
eral lateral pFC by the negative groups compared with the
positive groups (Figure 4A). None of our ROIs revealed
significantly more activity for the positive groups than
the negative groups.
DISCUSSION
We combined fMRI, a novel learning task, and a model of
trial-by-trial behavioral data to characterize the brain re-
gions involved in the acquisition of attitudes regarding
the valence of social groups. Our results reveal that activ-
ity in the anterior temporal lobe is correlated with the
emergence of prejudicial beliefs regarding the different
social groups and that activity in structures including
the anterior temporal lobe, lateral pFC, and dorsomedial
pFC tracks the prediction error when gradual learning
occurred. These findings provide new insights into the
brain regions involved in the formation of prejudice and
support the view that the anterior temporal lobe plays a
prominent role in learning and representing social–
emotional conceptual knowledge (Amodio, 2014; Olson,
McCoy, Klobusicky, & Ross, 2013; Wong & Gallate, 2012;
Zahn et al., 2007, 2009; Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007).
Moreover, our data are consistent with the temporal pole
learning the information via an error-correcting associative
learning system.
On the basis of a range of evidence, the anterior
temporal lobe has been viewed as a semantic hub where
amodal information about concepts are stored (Chadwick
et al., 2016; Visser, Jefferies, & Ralph, 2010; Patterson,
Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). Recently, it has been argued that
the anterior temporal lobe may play a privileged role in
storing knowledge of a socioemotional nature (Amodio,
2014; Olson et al., 2007, 2013; Wong & Gallate, 2012).
Damage to the temporal poles in humans and nonhuman
primates typically results in profound deficits in social
behavior and emotional regulation (Gozzi, Raymont,
Solomon, Koenigs, &Grafman, 2009; Thompson, Patterson,
& Hodges, 2003; Mychack, Kramer, Boone, & Miller, 2001;
Miller, Darby, Benson, Cummings, & Miller, 1997; Miller,
Darby, Swartz, Yener, &Mena, 1995; Kling, Tachiki, & Lloyd,
1993; Kling & Steklis, 1976; Franzen &Myers, 1973; Bucher,
Myers, & Southwick, 1970; Kluver & Bucy, 1939). Previous
neuroimaging research has often reported increased activ-
ity in the anterior temporal lobe during tasks that required
participants to make interferences about other agents’
mental states or emotions (Mitchell et al., 2006; Saxe &
Powell, 2006; German, Niehaus, Roarty, Giesbrecht, &
Miller, 2004; Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; Iacoboni
et al., 2004; Ohnishi et al., 2004; Calarge, Andreasen, &
O’Leary, 2003; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002;
Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; Moll et al.,
2002; Vogeley et al., 2001; Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé,
& Decety, 2000; Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000;
Gallagher et al., 2000) or during reported moments of
spontaneously thinking about other people’s mental
states (Spiers & Maguire, 2006). It has been argued that
such responses may relate to the role of the anterior tem-
poral cortex in the retrieval of stored knowledge about
likely mental states (Amodio, 2014; Olson et al., 2007; Frith
& Frith, 2006). However, to date, most of the research in
this area has examined the response of anterior temporal
lobe regions to discrete stimuli rather than tracking the
learning process. Thus, our finding that activity in the
anterior temporal lobe tracks changes in the perceived
valence of the different social groups provides, to our
knowledge, the first evidence that this region is involved
in the acquisition of prejudicial intergroup attitudes.
Although the response we observed in the anterior tem-
poral lobe may reflect neural activity involved in the encod-
ing of the new information into the network, it may also
represent activity associated with the activation of knowl-
edge stores during the learning process that are required
for the integration of new information. More research will
be required to explore these possibilities.
Although our data suggest that the anterior temporal
lobes are relatively selectively involved in learning the
likely valence of the behaviors of the social groups, we
found a separate network of brain regions involved in de-
tecting behavior that deviated from what was expected
for the group (prediction errors). Activity in this brain
network was specifically correlated with the prediction
error term in our model for the negative groups. A likely
reason for this is that the prediction errors for the posi-
tive groups varied little over the course of the scanning
sessions and would be predicted to relate to small fluc-
tuations in the fMRI signal, thus making it difficult to de-
tect them with our analysis. By contrast, for the negative
groups, we observed gradual learning across the five
blocks in the sessions, as evidenced by the much larger
learning rate parameter in our model for the negative
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groups. The network of brain regions that tracked the
prediction error for the negative groups included the
dorsomedial pFC, lateral pFC, and anterior temporal
lobe. These areas have been reported to be responsive
in situations involving making learned predictions about
another person’s behavior (Suzuki et al., 2012; Behrens
et al., 2008) or updating impressions of other people’s
behavior (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2012; Cloutier et al.,
2011). Thus, our data are consistent with frontotemporal
regions acting to compare incoming information with
stored knowledge (prejudicial attitudes) about groups
or individuals and updating these representations. Al-
though we cannot separate responses involved in detect-
ing the deviation from the expected valence and
updating the representations of the group-related atti-
tudes, it seems plausible that the temporal cortex is in-
volved in updating the stored representations and pFC
regions in detecting the deviation from that expectation.
This is based on evidence that damage to the temporal
lobes disrupts retrieval of long-term knowledge (see,
e.g., Patterson et al., 2007) and the frontal lobes with nov-
elty detection (see, e.g., Løvstad et al., 2012). Future re-
search separating attitude updating from the surprise of
encountering the behavior would be useful to determine
if this perspective is valid (see, e.g., O’Reilly et al., 2013),
as would experimental paradigms that can explore
whether the pathway between the anterior temporal pole
and medial pFC mediates the updating (Amodio, 2014;
Olson et al., 2013).
Previous studies using associative learning tasks with
nonsocial stimuli have often reported a correlation of ac-
tivity in the ventral striatum with prediction error (see,
e.g., O’Doherty, 2004). However, no such correlation
was observed in the current study using social stimuli.
Whereas increased striatal responses have been reported
for social stimuli that were a violation from predicted
norms (Harris & Fiske, 2010), other studies—like ours
—have not found striatal areas to follow prediction errors
for social stimuli (e.g., Cloutier et al., 2011; Behrens et al.,
2008). It is possible that striatal responses emerge when
the learning task involves direct corrective feedback, and
this may be why we did not observe a significant striatal
response to the prediction error. Several recent fMRI
studies lend credence to this view by reporting striatal
responses during learning tasks involving social stimuli
with feedback (Powers, Somerville, Kelley, & Heatherton,
2016; Zaki, Kallman, Wimmer, Ochsner, & Shohamy,
2016; Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). Thus, it would be
useful in future research to experimentally manipulate
the presence or absence of feedback in social stimuli-
based learning tasks to test this hypothesis. Although
we found no ventral striatal response to the prediction
error, for either all groups or only the negative groups,
we did find increased activity in the ventral striatum
(and ACC/medial pFC) for the minority groups compared
with the majority groups. We found, similar to prior re-
search (Murphy et al., 2011), that minority groups were
generally rated as being less strong in valence com-
pared with the majority groups, despite being a priori
matched for valence to majority groups. This less ex-
treme rating for minority groups in the context of
changing ratings is consistent with a slower learning be-
cause of the less frequent provision of information
(Murphy et al., 2011).
Three factors may explain the ventral striatal and ACC/
pFC responses to minority groups. The first factor is the
potential slowed learning, which may have meant that,
over the course of the scanning session, the striatum
was more consistently engaged by the minority groups
because of its putative role in providing an associative
learning signal (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997).
However, it is notable that the prediction error values
in our model did not significantly correlate with the ven-
tral striatum response profile. The second factor is the
pure stimulus novelty, with the minority group names ap-
pearing less frequently on the screen than the majority
names, independent of any information provided by
the descriptions of behavior. However, in our control
task, we found no evidence that a simple difference in
the frequency of encountering members of the minority
and majority control groups (in the absence of descrip-
tions of their behaviors) led to an increased activity in
these brain regions, even at liberal uncorrected thresh-
olds. Although pure stimulus novelty for group names
seems unlikely to have accounted for the neural re-
sponses to the minority groups, we cannot rule out the
possibility of an interaction between stimulus novelty and
learning. Finally, it has been argued that attention shifts
from the majority to minority groups as learning pro-
ceeds (Sherman et al., 2009). Thus, it is possible that
the shift in attention to the minority groups also interacts
with the other factors to result in the greater evoked ven-
tral striatal responses to the minority groups.
Although we had predicted that our participants would
show slower learning of the valence of the minority
groups, mirroring past work on the “illusory correlation”
effect (Murphy et al., 2011; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976),
we did not predict that learning would be more extensive
over the learning blocks for the negative groups than the
positive groups. Indeed, previous studies have found
pronounced differences between the minority and major-
ity groups using positively valenced stimuli (Murphy
et al., 2011; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). The more exten-
sive learning we observed for the negative groups may
have occurred because negative behaviors were, in gen-
eral, more unusual (counter normative) than positive be-
haviors, making them more salient and memorable.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that negative behaviors
are judged as more diagnostic of a person’s true charac-
ter than positive behaviors (Cone & Ferguson, 2015),
which would privilege negative behaviors for learning.
It will be useful in the future research to determine if,
when absolute valence and familiarity of the behaviors
are matched, there persists a difference in the learning
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about the valence of negative and positive groups.
Similarly, such research would be useful to clarify if the
saliency underlies the anterior cingulate response ob-
served in the comparison of reading negative behaviors
compared with reading positive behaviors.
Because participants reported changes in their liking
of the different groups, these findings relate most closely
to the development of prejudice (Fiske, 1998). That said,
the use of an explicit report measure means that we can-
not be sure if these attitudes involved an affective com-
mitment (“I do not like Group A”) or were purely
cognitive/conceptual (“I know that members of Group
A perform negative behaviors, so I will give Group A a
low rating of likeability”). However, previous work has
used an implicit measure of evaluation to demonstrate
that the kind of learning procedure used in the current
experiment does produce changes in affect regarding
the different groups (Le Pelley, Calvini, & Spears, 2013).
The implication is that the attitudes formed in the current
study may well have had an affective component,
although it remains for future research to confirm this.
Taken together, our data provide support for the role
of the anterior temporal lobe in the formation of prejudi-
cial intergroup attitudes and the pFC and temporal cortex
in detecting violations of these attitudes. In future work,
it will be important to separate familiarity and imageabil-
ity from valence in the stimuli used for learning. This will
help determine whether the results reported here are
specific to learning about the valence of social groups
or whether familiarity and imageability also contribute
to the neural responses. It will also be useful to explore
whether it is possible to dissociate the response of brain
regions involved in updating stored representations,
from those detecting the attitude violation.
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